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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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The Americans and British made an essential error during this
discussion as to whether or not the Polish Government represented
the Polish people. In their appraisal of this problem., the Press employed
the criterion which held good during both peace and war in their happier
countries, where the internal life was beyond the scope of disasters
directly inflicted by war and occupation. The Polish people were actually
in the battle zone, in the centre of the typhoon5 and the problem of govern-
ment was therefore more limited—in that country there had to be a real
truce between parties existing in the Underground since no opportunity
to influence or arrange any question in connection with internal policy
could arise. " The Poles in Poland/' explained an officer of the
Underground Army, who had recently arrived from that country^ to the
British Foreign Secretary, " enslaved as they are, look to the Government
as the projection of their own hopes., something apart from personalities.,
a symbol which is valuable to them because it has been upheld/5* The
political question of the moment was concentrated in their foreign policy,
and the Polish people with the unit}- which astonished even the most
hardened critic, were not concerned as to whether the Government was
c right' or £ left* but only how efficiently it was prosecuting the Polish
war-aims. Under these circumstances any legal Polish Government
would have had the support of its people as long as it was fighting for
the integrity of their State.
From the April of 19433 tae slogan of a c friendly government *
Poland became the chief factor in Moscow's propaganda campaign against
the Polish Government. What that term implied can be judged by the
events in those countries where such * friendly governments * had been
instituted by the Soviets. Bilmanis, the Latvian Ambassador in the U.S.3
in his book The Baltic States and the Baltic Sea (New York, 1942),, gave
a remarkable description of the technique applied by Moscow in con-
nection with similar governments in order to attain the submission and
subsequent annexation of the country.
The first stage was, as Bilmanis wrote,cc The Mutual Assistance treaties
forced upon the Baltic States, ostensibly to protect them against aggression
from c any great European Power/ Le0 Germany and Great Britain.
Then comes the second stage :
"After the fall of Paris on June 13, 1940, Soviet Russia . . . presented a
short-termed ultimatum to Lithuania on June 14, to Latvia and Estonia on
June 15, 1940, demanding, under threat of immediate bombardments the
establishment in the Baltic countries of pro-Soviet governments and free
entrance for Russian troops. The Soviet ultimatum to Latvia was backed
by sixteen divisions massed at the Latvian frontier „ . . Russia presented
c reasons * for this act of aggression; she charged that Latvia had conspired
with the other Baltic States of Estonia and Lithuania (six million population
altogether) to attack Russia."
" During the last years/' writes the official Soviet pamphlet, (The Somet
Union* Finland and the Baltic States., the Soviet Information Bureau, 1941.>
* The Times., February 9th, 1944.